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It  uses a nationally representative sample of 16,478 high school children surveyed in 1995.  The
sample  includes not only detailed information on offenses, but also data on personal, family and
neighborhood  characteristics as well as deterrence measures.  We analyze the determinants of selling
drugs, committing assault, robbery, burglary and theft, separately for males and females.
          We find that an increase in violent crime arrests reduces the probability of selling drugs and
assaulting someone  for males, and reduces the probability of selling drugs and stealing for females.
An  increase in local unemployment increases the propensity to commit crimes, as does local poverty.
Similarly, family  poverty increases the probability to commit robbery, burglary and theft for males,
and  assault and burglary for females.  Local characteristics are more important for females than males.
The results also indicate that family supervision has an impact on delinquent behavior. 
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economic  theory. Employment opportunities, increased family income and more strict deterrence are
effective tools to reduce juvenile crime.
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Economic Conditions, Deterrence and Juvenile Crime:
Evidence from Micro Data
I. Introduction
The American public ranked crime as the most important problem facing the
nation in 1999 (Gallup Organization, 1999).  Juvenile crime, in particular, has
received a great deal of attention from the public, the media (Washington Post  1999, 
Los Angeles Times 1999, Newsweek 1999), and social scientists.  Some analysts
argue that very little, if anything, can be done to discourage young Americans from
participating in illegal activities.  For example, DiIulio (1996) indicates that urban
ethnographers believe that today’s crime-prone youngsters are too present oriented for
any type of conventional criminal deterrence to work.   Similarly, Bennett, DiIulio and
Walters (1996) state that “America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile ‘super-
predators’—radically  impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, including even more
preteenage boys, who murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-
toting gangs, and create serious communal disorder.  They do not fear the stigma of
arrest, the pains of imprisonment, or the pangs of conscience… To these mean-street
youngsters, the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ have no fixed moral meaning.”
1
However, the notion of an irrational “new-breed” of juvenile criminal who does not
respond to incentives is based on anecdotal as opposed to strong empirical evidence. 
Moreover, it contradicts the economic model of crime developed by Becker (1968) and
tested using aggregate data and micro data on the adult population (e.g., Witte 1980,
Cornwell and Trumbull 1994, Levitt 1997, Corman and Mocan, forthcoming).  In recent
work, using state-level data, Levitt (1998) found that the juvenile crime rate is negatively
related to the severity of penalties, indicating that the economic model of crime applies to
juveniles as well as adults.  Furthermore, the sharp increase in the juvenile crime in late-
1980s, and the drop in the mid-1990s implies that juvenile crime may be more malleable
than suggested.
                    
1  Bennet, DiIulio and Walters (1996) as cited by Levitt (1998).2
Investigation of the determinants of juvenile crime is important, not only
because of the nature of the problem, but also because of the implications of juvenile
crime for adolescents’  behavior in the future.  For example, Mocan and Overland (1999)
show that current criminal activity makes future criminal activity more likely by
simultaneously increasing the criminal human capital of the participant and depreciating
his legal human capital, and  Bound and Freeman (1992) document a negative
relationship between criminal participation and labor market attachment, stating that  "…
the growth rate of the population with a criminal record accounts for one third of the
longer run erosion of employment [of black male high school dropouts].”  In addition,
Freeman and Rodgers (1999) show that areas with the most rapidly rising rates of
incarceration are areas in which youths, particularly black youths, have had the worst
earning and employment experience between the mid 1980s and late 1990s, suggesting a
negative relationship between labor market outcomes and a criminal record.
There is no study in the economics literature that investigates the determinants of
juvenile crime using micro data, although three papers have analyzed the behavior of
young adults. Viscusi (1986) used  data on 2,358 black men ages 16 to 24, living in
Boston, Chicago and Philadelphia in 1979.  Tauchen, Witte and Griesinger (1994)
analyzed the criminal activity of 567 men ages 19-25 who were born in Philadelphia in
1945, and Grogger (1998) used the NLSY to investigate the determinants of criminal
behavior of 1,134 men ages 14-21 in 1980.  Although these papers provide interesting
insights into the determinants of criminal activity for young adults, they all have
limitations. The Viscusi (1986) and Tauchen et al. (1994) samples are not nationally
representative, and all three papers lack good measures of criminal activity or legal
sanctions.
2 Furthermore, none of these papers use data on recent cohorts, around whom
the current debate centers, and none specifically analyze juvenile delinquency.
3
                    
2 In Tauchen et al. (1994) criminal activity is measured by being arrested, or by a crime seriousness
index.  In Viscusi (1986) criminal activity is measured by committing any crime; and Grogger (1998)
considers only property crimes.  Viscusi (1986) and Grogger (1998) have no measures of deterrence.
3 Viscusi analyzes young adults who are born between 1955 and 1963;  Grogger (1998)
analyzes young adults whose birthdays are between 1959 and 1964, and Tauchen et al. (1994)
sample uses young adults born in 1945.3
The criminology literature on juvenile crime is more extensive, but it too has
limitations.  Often the measure of criminal involvement is based on arrest records, or is
based on parent/teacher reports (Wright, Cullen and Williams, 1997).  Most researchers
use either small samples (e.g. n=200 in Baron and Hartnagel 1997), or data from a
single city or region (e.g. data from Alberta, Canada in LaGrange and Silverman 1999;
Dunedin, New Zealand in Wright et al. 1999; Rochester, New York in Smith and
Thornberry 1995).  No study simultaneously controls for the effects of economic and
deterrence variables as well as personal and family characteristics.
An ongoing debate in crime literature is the relative importance of labor market
opportunities and criminal sanctions on the level of criminal activity.   Freeman (1983),
reviewed a number of studies employing measures of criminal sanctions and labor market
conditions. He concluded that sanctions have a greater impact on criminal behavior than
do labor market factors: that is, the “stick” seems to be more effective than the “carrot.”
 The findings of Corman and Mocan’s recent time-series analysis (forthcoming) also
provide some support for this conclusion. They found that poverty is positively related to
homicides, but arrests and police force have a negative impact on a variety of criminal
activities.  In contrast, researchers using data on prison releases have reported mixed
results with regard to the relative importance of deterrence versus labor market
opportunities (e.g. Witte 1980,  Myers 1983).  Information on the importance of
deterrence versus labor market conditions is absent for juvenile crime.
This paper presents the first economic analysis of juvenile crime using
individual-level data. The nationally representative sample includes not only detailed
information on offenses, but also data on personal, family and neighborhood
characteristics as well as deterrence measures.   Because individual-level, as opposed to
aggregate data, are used, the estimated relationships between sanctions and criminal
activity represent the impact of deterrence.  Put differently, they don’t suffer from
potential confounding of the incapacitation effect that necessarily emerges in aggregate
data (e.g., Corman and Mocan, forthcoming; Levitt, 1998).  We analyze the
determinants of selling drugs, committing assault, robbery, burglary and theft, and find
that juvenile crime is responsive to sanctions and incentives as predicted by economic4
theory. 
II.  The Data
The primary data source for this project is the National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent Health “Wave I In-home Interview.”  These data come from a nationally
representative survey of students in grades 7 through 12.  The Wave I In-Home
Interview was completed by 20,745 adolescents, both males and females, between
September 1994 and December 1995.  Detailed demographic information such as
religion, race/ethnicity, parents’ education, and family structure are available in the
data. 
After deleting individuals 18 years of age and older, and individuals with
missing information, our sample contains 16,478 observations.  Descriptive statistics
are presented in Table 1.  The sample is almost evenly split between males and
females, and non-whites are over-sampled.  The overwhelming majority of individuals
in the sample (96 percent) are between the ages of 13 and 17 at the time of the survey.
 The minimum age is 11, but only 13 individuals (0.08 percent of the sample) are 11
years of age, and 16 percent of the sample are thirteen or younger.   Twenty-four
percent are black, 7 percent are Asian, 2 percent are Native American, and 9 percent
of the sample indicated that they belonged to some other race.  Seventeen percent of
the sample are of Hispanic origin.  Ten percent indicated that their father did not have
a high school degree, and 14 percent indicated that their mother did not have a high
school degree. Sixty-six percent of the adolescents lived with two parents, and 12
percent indicated that their family was on welfare.
Because of confidentiality concerns, the geographical location of the
respondents are not included in the data.  However, each individual in the data set is
matched with relevant characteristics of the county of residence.  These variables,
which include the unemployment rate, the population density, measures of
urbanization, and racial makeup are obtained from the 1990 Census of Population and
Housing.  Means and standard deviations of these variables are reported in the second
part of Table 1. 5
The third part of Table 1 contains additional county level information, such as
per capita police and welfare spending in the county, the proportion of the county
population who voted Democratic and the proportion who voted for Ross Perot in the
1992 presidential elections. These variables are obtained from USA Counties (Bureau
of the Census, 1994), and are intended to capture local-area characteristics that may
impact criminal behavior (Glaeser et al. 1996, Sah 1991).
The final three variables reported in Table 1 are the crime rate, and the arrest
rates for violent and property crimes in the county of residence, all obtained from the
FBI Uniform Crime Reports.
The survey includes a number of detailed questions with regard to delinquent
behavior.  Specifically, respondents were asked if in the past 12 months they had
committed any of the following acts: assault, robbery, burglary, theft, and the selling
of drugs.  Individuals who replied in the affirmative were then asked whether they
engaged in each of these acts on one or two occasions, three or four occasions, or five
or more occasions.  The reliability and validity of self-reported data are well
established, and self-repoted data and official crime data generally yield similar
information (Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis 1981,  Elliott and Voss 1974).  A
comparison of the extent of juvenile crime obtained from our data and the one inferred
from official data is presented later in the paper.
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of juvenile criminal participation. 
Seven and three-tenths percent of juveniles sold marijuana or other drugs during the
past 12 months; 19.4 percent assaulted someone, 4.4 percent committed robbery, 5.4
percent committed burglary, and 5.6 percent stole something worth more than $50. 
Roughly half of those who sold drugs did so one or two times.  The rate is
approximately 70 percent for those who committed robbery, burglary or theft. 
Seventy-six percent of those who assaulted someone did so one or two times during the
12 month period.
The frequency of criminal activity by race and gender is displayed in the first
panel of Table 3.  The cells present the proportion of males and females who committed
at least one crime (selling drugs, assault, robbery, burglary, or theft) over the course of6
the year.  Forty-six percent of male Native-American juveniles and 40 percent of black
male juveniles committed at least one crime during the 12 month period preceding the
survey.  The rates are 35 percent for white males and 31 percent for Asian males.  The
rates for females are approximately half that of males for each race.  The second panel of
Table 3 displays the proportion of juveniles who committed different types of crimes by
gender.  Only one percent of males committed all five crimes, and 23.5 percent
committed only one type of crime.
Table 4 displays the prevalence of different offenses by race and gender.  Regarding
selling drugs, Asians have the lowest commission rate with 6.6 percent for males and less
than 3 percent for females.  In contrast, almost one out of five Native American male
adolescents sold drugs at least once during the past year. The participation rates for males
range from 4 to 9 percent for robbery, 7 to 14 percent for theft, and 6 to 12.5 percent for
burglary among races.  The rates for assault range from 23 percent to 35 percent.  Native
American juveniles have the highest crime rates in all crime categories, and Asian
juveniles have the lowest crime rates.
It has been recognized that males commit more criminal offenses than females
(Gottfredson and Hirshi 1990,  Henggeler 1989, Horwitz and White 1987).   Consistent
with previous reports, our data set reveals that female juveniles offend at about half the
rate of their male counterparts.  Criminologists and sociologists have developed a number
of theories to explain the contrast in criminal behavior between the genders.  It has been
argued that gender differences in delinquent behavior can be attributed to differential
supervision of families for their sons and daughters (e.g. Hagan, Simpson and Gillis
1979), or to the difference in self-control between the sexes (Gottfredson and Hirschi
1990).  The contrast in delinquent behavior can also be attributed to differences in risk
aversion (Powell and Ansic, 1997), discount rates ( Lau and Williams 1998), or the
motivation for security (Schnieder and Lopes, 1986).  To account for these differences,
models are estimated separately for males and females.
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 5  suggest relationships between 
juvenile crime, family structure, and family poverty as measured by welfare status. 
Seventy-five percent of the adolescents who come from a two-parent household do not7
engage in any crime; while the rate is 67 percent for those who come from one or no-
parent families. Similar differences in crime commission rates are observed for those who
are involved in one, two, three or four different types of crimes.  The propensity to
commit a particular crime is also lower for those juveniles who come from two-parent
families.  For example, 6.3 percent of the juveniles who have two parents sell drugs,
while the rate is 9.5 percent for those who have one or no parent.  The same regularity is
observed for juveniles whose families are on welfare.  The bottom two panels of Table 5
show that juveniles from families receiving public assistance have a higher propensity to
commit any given crime, and are, in general, more likely to engage in criminal behavior.
III.  Juvenile Crime in the U.S.
Column I of Table 6 displays the population-weighted juvenile crime
participation rates for different offenses obtained from our data set.  For comparison
purposes, column II presents the participation rates obtained from Wave 3 of the
National Youth Survey, conducted in 1979 (Ploeger 1997).  Although the two surveys
are 15 years apart, the juvenile crime rates are of the same general magnitude. 
However, in our data, which depict juvenile criminal behavior 1994-95, the
participation rates for burglary and theft are higher, whereas the participation rates for
selling drugs is lower.
Using the crime commission rates calculated from our data and employing
population weights, we estimated the number of juveniles who committed different
crimes in the U.S. in 1994.  The results, which are reported in column III of Table 6,
indicate that in 1994 1.2 million juveniles sold drugs, and almost 3.3 million juveniles
assaulted someone.  Eight-hundred and sixty-thousand juveniles were involved in theft,
866,000 committed burglary, and 725,000 committed robbery.  Because the data set also
contains information on the frequency of these offenses, we are able to calculate the total
number of crimes committed by juveniles in each category.  If the respondent indicated
that he/she committed 1 to 2 offenses it is converted into 1.5 offenses.  A report of 3 to 4
offenses is converted in 3.5 offenses; and if the respondent indicated that an offense is
committed 5 or more times, it is converted into 5.5 crimes.  Using this algorithm, we8
calculated the total offenses committed for each crime, which is reported in column IV.  
There were 3.7 million drug sales by juveniles, and 7 million assaults.  They committed a
total of 1.7 million robberies, 2 million burglaries and 2 million thefts. 
The above numbers can be compared to information obtained from official crime
statistics.  The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) of the FBI relies on information compiled
by local law enforcement agencies.  The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)
of the Bureau of Justice Statistics gathers crime information by asking a nationally
representative sample of persons ages 12 and above about crimes in which they were the
victim.  To obtain an estimate of juvenile crime in 1994 using official data, we followed
the algorithm used by Levitt (1998), calculating the number of juvenile crimes as
[JARR/TARR]*CRIME, where JARR is juvenile arrests, TARR is total arrests, and
CRIME is the number of total crimes committed in a given category.  This algorithm
assumes that the proportion of juvenile arrests for a given type of crime is a good proxy
for the proportion of juveniles actually committing that type of crime.  The arrest
information is obtained from the UCR, and the crime information is obtained from the
NCVS.  Column V displays the number of juvenile crimes suggested by the algorithm. 
Table 6 indicates that the imputation of juvenile crime using official arrest and
victimization data may overstate the extent of juvenile theft, and understate juvenile
assault and robbery.
IV. Basic Methodology and Results
Following the seminal work of Becker (1968) and its extensions by Ehrlich
(1973) and   Block and Heineke (1975), we postulate that participation in criminal
activity is the result of an optimizing individual’s reaction to incentives.  More precisely,
individuals engage in criminal activities depending upon the expected payoffs of the
criminal activity, the return to legal labor market activity, tastes, and the costs of
criminal activity, such as those associated with apprehension, conviction and
punishment.  Following this framework, the empirical implementation is depicted as
follows:9
(1)   Cij = aj+Xij’bj+ Yij’gj +Zij’dj+ eij,
where Cij is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of one if individual i
participated in crime j, and zero otherwise.  The vector X consists of individual
characteristics, such as age, race, ethnicity and religion.  It also includes family
characteristics, such as parent education, family’s welfare participation and family
structure.  The vector Y includes neighborhood characteristics, such as the county
poverty as measured by per capita local welfare spending, and other county
characteristics such as the population density and the proportion of population who are
black or Hispanic.   Following Levitt (1998), we also include the total number of
crimes in the county per 100,000 population to control for the impact of omitted
factors that may influence juvenile crime.
Legal employment opportunities are measured by the unemployment rate in
the county.   Although theoretically well-defined, the relationship between crime and
unemployment is found to be modest in economics literature (Freeman 1983). 
Criminology literature includes conflicting results on unemployment-crime relationship
(Kapuscinski, Braithwaite and Chapman, 1998).  
The data set does not contain a measure of wages for juveniles.  This is not a
drawback because all individuals in the data set are high school students, and
therefore, controlling for age, there should be little variation in wages.  On the other
hand, employment opportunities may vary significantly, and, in fact, area
unemployment has been shown to have a sizable effect on the employment probability
of young adults (Freeman and Rodgers 1999).  The local unemployment in the data set
pertains to 1990, while most of the crime information for juveniles pertains to 1994. 
To the extent that there is hysteresis in unemployment, this is not a major issue.  Also,
it should be noted that Freeman and Rodgers (1999) find that past unemployment has
an independent effect on the current labor market outcomes of young workers.
The vector Z consists of variables that measure sanctions at the county level. 
They are the arrest rates per violent crime, the arrest rate for the property crimes and per
capita local government spending on police protection.  Our arrest variables pertain to the10
total arrest rates for violent and property crimes, instead of juvenile arrests, reducing the
likelihood of reverse causality from individual criminal activity to total arrest rates. 
Perhaps of greater importance, the arrest variables correspond to 1993, while criminal
activity pertains to 1994-95.  Thus, an increase in the arrest rates in 1993 is assumed to
impact juvenile delinquent behavior approximately one year later, but an increase in
juvenile crime cannot change the arrest rates in the previous year.  Police expenditures
are measured in 1987, seven years prior to the behavior we are investigating. 
Admittedly, this is a long lag, even in the presence of high serial correlation in police
spending.  Further, this measure of police spending not only includes expenditures on
police protection and other crime prevention activities, but also activities that have little
or no impact on crime, such as traffic safety and vehicular inspection.  These issues may
make it difficult to detect a significant relationship between crime and police spending,
but this is the only police expenditure available in the data.  Tests for the exogeneity of
the deterrence measures are carried out, and are explained below.
Tables 7A-7E present the results from probit models for criminal participation
for males for five different crimes.  The entries are the marginal effects, and the
associated standard errors are reported in parentheses.   Huber corrected standard errors
are reported to account for within-county correlation between error terms.
Selling Drugs
Table 7A presents estimates of Equation (1) for selling drugs.  All else equal,
blacks have almost a 2 percent higher propensity to sell drugs.   Asians are 3 percent less
likely to sell drugs, and Native Americans are 10 percent more likely.  Hispanic origin is
associated with an increase in this probability of almost 3 percent.  Age also has a
positive impact on the likelihood of selling drugs. All else equal, adolescents who are 14
years old have almost a 10 percent higher probability of selling drugs in comparison to
individuals in 12-to-13 year age group (the omitted category).  Juveniles who are 15, 16
and 17 years of age are 13 percent, 16 percent and 18 percent more likely, respectively,
to sell drugs. 
Religious beliefs influence the selling of drugs.  Adolescents who identified11
themselves as Born Again Christians are 3 percent less likely to sell drugs.  Juveniles
who identified themselves as having no religious beliefs are 3 percent more likely to
engage in the selling of drugs.   This result is consistent with results reported by Freeman
(1986), who showed that churchgoing affects the allocation of time, school attendance,
work activity and deviant behavior, and helps youths escape from inner-city poverty.   It
can be argued that the link between religion and criminal activity is not causal, but
unobservable characteristics of juveniles which affect their religious beliefs also influence
their criminal behavior.  Following Freeman (1986) we postulate that if religious beliefs
are endogenous, rather than exogenous, the pattern of the relationship between
independent variables and crime would be similar to the ones in an equation explaining
religious belief.  A probit model in which a dichotomous variable takes the value of one
if the juvenile has no religion, and zero otherwise is estimated as a function of the same
background variables in our crime equations.  The results, which are reported in the
Appendix (Table A1) show a different pattern of results than found from the crime
regressions.  For example, being of Hispanic origin lowers the probability of having no
religious beliefs.  Unemployment and two-parent household have no impact on religion,
but the proportion of blacks, the proportion who voted Democratic or voted for Ross
Perot in the county affect religious beliefs.  Low-educated mothers make it less likely for
male juveniles to have religious beliefs.  These results, which are similar to those
reported by Freeman (1986) suggest a causal mechanism from religion to juvenile
criminal behavior.
If the mother attended, but did not graduate from college, this increases the
probability of selling drugs in comparison to cases where the mother has a college
degree.  The presence of two parents in the family decreases the probability of selling
drugs by 3 percent in comparison to single or no parent families.  The coefficient of the
variable measuring family poverty is positive but statistically insignificant.
The characteristics of the neighborhood also have an impact on the behavior of
the juveniles. Per capita local welfare spending in the county has a positive impact on the
propensity to sell drugs.  If increased poverty, represented by high welfare spending, is
associated with a reduced demand for drugs because of a negative income effect, the12
corresponding reduction in price and transaction in drugs may reduce the producer
surplus in the market.  Under this scenario, a hard-core, professional drug seller may
leave the market, creating room for the entry of juvenile sellers.
The unemployment rate is positive and significant, suggesting that living in areas
with few employment opportunities encourages male juveniles to earn illegal incomes by
selling drugs.  The population density of the county has a negative effect on selling drugs,
indicating that, all else equal, living in the low density areas increases the propensity to
sell drugs for juveniles.  The proportion of Hispanics in the county negatively impacts the
propensity to sell drugs, and the probability goes up with the proportion of population
who voted for Ross Perot and Democratic in 1992 presidential elections.   
Per capita police spending and the arrest rate for property crimes in the county
have no impact on the decision to sell drugs, but as predicted by economic model of
crime, an increase in the arrest rate for violent crimes in the county decreases the
probability of selling drugs for juveniles.  Specifically, an additional arrest per violent
crime reduces the probability of selling drugs for juvenile males by 4 percent.
Assault
Table 7B presents the estimated probit models for assault for juvenile males. 
The only race effect is for blacks: black male adolescents have almost 4 percent higher
probability of assaulting someone, keeping constant personal, family, and county
characteristics, and deterrence measures.   The coefficients of AGE14 is positive and
statistically significant, while the coefficients of AGE15, AGE16 and AGE17 are not
different from zero. This suggests that the propensity to assault for juvenile males peaks
at age 14.  Being a Born-Again Christian lowers the probability of committing assault by
3.7 percent, while being a Catholic lowers it by 3.1 percent.
Mother’s education has no impact on the offspring’s propensity to assault, but
adolescent males are 8 percent more likely to assault if their father has only a high school
education, and 5 percent more likely to assault if the father attended, but not finished
college.  Children from two-parent families have 4 percent lower probability to assault,
all else being the same. 13
Poverty in the county is positively related to the likelihood to commit assault,
which is consistent with the finding of Corman and Mocan (forthcoming), who report a
positive relationship between poverty and murders in New York City.   Table 7B also
presents additional evidence to support the deterrence hypothesis.  An additional arrest
per violent crime is associated with a reduction in the probability of assault for juvenile
males by 6 percent.
Robbery
Table 7C presents the results for robbery.  Black male juveniles have 1.5 percent
higher probability to commit robbery than whites.    There are no statistical differences
between estimated age coefficients.   This suggests that 14-to-17 year olds are more likely
to commit robbery than younger children, but otherwise there are no significant
differences by age.  Coming from a two-parent family has no impact on committing
robbery, but if a parent receives public assistance the juvenile’s propensity to commit
robbery is 2.5 percent higher. 
Unemployment and poverty in the county have positive impacts, demonstrating the
importance of economic conditions.  For example, a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate is associated with a three percent increase in the probability of
committing a robbery.   However, the results from this regression provide no evidence of
a deterrence effect.  The estimated coefficients of the arrest and police spending variables
are neither individually, nor jointly significant.  These results suggest that family and
neighborhood poverty are better predictors of the propensity to committing robbery than
deterrence variables.
Burglary
Table 7D presents the results for burglary.  Native American male juveniles and
juveniles belonging to the “other race” category have a higher propensity to burglarize.  
As was the case for robbery, the hypothesis of the equality of the age coefficients cannot
be rejected.   Having no religious beliefs increases the probability to commit burglary by
4 percent.  County characteristics, including unemployment and poverty have no impact14
on burglary, but family poverty has a positive impact: if the family is on welfare, this
increases the child’s propensity to commit burglary by 3 percent.   Arrest rates and police
force do not have an impact on burglaries committed by male juveniles.
Theft
Table 7E displays the results for theft.  All else equal, Native Americans have a
higher propensity to commit theft.  Adolescents who are 14 years of age are more likely
to steal in comparison to younger ones, and adolescents who are 15-17 are more likely to
steal in comparison to 14 year olds.  Having no religious beliefs increases the propensity
to steal by 4 percent.  If the family is on welfare, the probability to steal is 4 percent
higher.
Although the deterrence variables are lagged, their potential endogeneity cannot be
ruled out.  Following Tauchen, Witte and Griesinger (1994) we tested the endogeneity of
per capita police spending and arrest rates.  Using the Rivers and Vuong test (1988), we
instrumented our deterrence measures with county government spending on education
and health, and state spending on education, health, and welfare. In the first stage
regressions the five instruments were jointly extremely significant (p=0.000), and in no
case could we reject the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the deterrence variables.
All the models were also estimated for females. The results revealed interesting
differences between male and female juvenile criminal behavior.  Table A2 in the
appendix summarizes the results for females.  In contrast to the male results, the
propensity to sell drugs is lower for black female juveniles as compared to white females.
Parental education has a more pronounced impact on female delinquency than was the
case for males.  Similarly, local area characteristics such as population density,
proportion of population in rural areas and proportion Hispanic are more important
determinants of female criminal activity.  There is also a difference in the age-crime
relationship.  With the exception of selling drugs, female juvenile criminal activity peaks
before age 17 for females. Violent crime arrests deter theft and drug sales of females. 
Finally, we estimated ordered probit models for both genders.  As reported in15
Table 2, criminal activity is classified into four different  frequency categories for each
offense: zero offenses, one to two offenses, three to four offenses, and five or more
offenses.  The results of these ordered probits are consistent with the participation
regression results, and the results for males are presented in the Appendix.
V.  Summary and Simulations
Table 8 summarizes the results reported in Tables 7A-7E for selected variables. 
Some of the county characteristics and variables that were consistently statistically
insignificant are not included.  The variables in the upper section of Table 8 can be
thought of as non-policy variables. They are race, age and religion of the juvenile male. 
It is not clear why race is a determinant of criminal activity after controlling for a host of
personal, family and neighborhood characteristics. It is possible that race is capturing
some effect not measured by the variables in the model.  For example, although all of the
individuals in our sample are enrolled in high school, it is possible that the quality of
education is correlated with race.
The variables in the lower section of Table 8 can be manipulated by policy
makers.  Among them are parental education, family structure, family poverty,
unemployment and poverty in the county of residence, and the arrest rate for violent
crimes in the county.  Selling drugs and assaults are sensitive to increases in violent crime
arrests.  Family poverty, measured by family welfare status has a positive impact on
juveniles’ involvement in robbery, burglary, and theft.  County poverty, measured by per
capita local welfare spending, has a positive impact on selling drugs, assault, and
robbery.  Local unemployment affects the selling of drugs and robbery. 
The presence of two parents in the family lowers juvenile males’ participation in
assault and selling drugs, perhaps a reflection of parental supervision.  Glaeser, Sacerdote
and Scheinkman (1996) explore the influence of social interactions on crime.  They find
higher levels of social interactions in cities with more female-headed households, and
suggest that social interactions among criminals are higher if the family units are not
intact.  Our results can also be seen as providing support for the social interaction
hypothesis.  Specifically, the negative relationship between two-parent households and16
juvenile crime may be due to closer supervision of children in these households.
The effects summarized in Table 8 are often substantial in magnitude.  Moving
from a one- or no-parent household to a two-parent household reduces the probability of
selling drugs by 2.7 percent and the probability of assault by 3.8 percent (Table 9).  If the
family leaves the welfare rolls, this reduces the propensity to commit property crimes for
the juvenile male.  More precisely, the probability to commit robbery, burglary and theft
goes down by 2.5 percent, 3 percent, and 4.4 percent, respectively.  As Table 9
demonstrates, a two percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate lowers the
probability of selling drugs by 0.8 percent, and the probability of committing robbery by
0.6 percent.  A 50 percent increase in the arrest rate for violent crimes reduces the
probability of selling drugs by 1.1 percent, and the probability of assault by 1.4 percent.
A natural question to ask is how consistent these results are with recent trends in
juvenile crime. Time-series data on juvenile crime are not available.  Following Levitt
(1998), juvenile crime can be imputed by using the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI
and the National Crime Victimization Survey data.  Using the algorithm described
earlier, we calculated that in 1989 there were a total of 4.7 million crimes committed by
juveniles.  This is the sum of juvenile robberies, assaults, burglaries and thefts.  Total
juvenile crime increased to 7.8 million by 1993: an increase of 3.1 million offenses. 
During the same time period the arrest rates and police spending increased as well. 
However, these increases are potentially endogenous; they may have been determined by
increases in crime rate.  On the other hand, there were two changes during the same
period which can be considered exogenous.  The aggregate unemployment rate increased
by 1.4 percentage points (from 5.5 percent to 6.9 percent) and the AFDC caseload also
increased during the same period (U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means 1998) . 
(Specifically, the number of AFDC children increased by 1 million between 1988 and
1993).  Using these numbers and the estimated parameters presented in the paper, a
rough calculation indicates that the increase in unemployment and family poverty can
explain approximately 14 percent of the increase in juvenile crime between 1989 and
1993.  By 1996, the unemployment rate went down to 5.4 percent, and the number of
children in poverty decreased by 1.1 million.  The total number of juvenile crimes went17
down to 7.2 million offenses.  The decline in unemployment and poverty explain 28
percent of the decrease in juvenile crime during this period.
VI.  Conclusion
This is the first paper to test the economic model of crime for juveniles using
micro data.  It uses a nationally representative sample of 16,478 high school children
surveyed in 1995.  The data set allows for a portrayal of the extent of juvenile crime, as
well as an investigation of race and gender differences in criminal behavior and the
impacts of economic and deterrence variables.
In 1994 approximately 7 million juveniles (one-quarter of adolescents in 11-17
age group) were involved in at least one type of criminal act.  One million and two
hundred thousand juveniles sold drugs, 3.3 million assaulted someone, 725,000 juveniles
committed robbery, 866,000 committed burglary and 860,000 stole something worth
more than $50, and they committed a total of 16.5 million offenses in 1994.  There are
substantial differences between races in crime commission rates.  For example, 46
percent of Native American juvenile males committed at least one crime, while the rates
are 40 percent for black males, 35 percent for white males, 31 percent for Asian males. 
Almost one out of five Native American males sold drugs.  The corresponding rates are
approximately one-in-ten for blacks and whites, and one-in-fifteen for Asian males.  The
crime commission rates of females are roughly half that of males.
We find that juveniles respond to incentives as predicted by economic theory. 
An increase in violent crime arrests reduces the probability of selling drugs and assaulting
someone for males, and reduces the probability of selling drugs and stealing for females.
 An increase in local unemployment increases the propensity to commit crimes, as does
local poverty.  Similarly, family poverty increases the probability to commit robbery,
burglary and theft for males, and assault and burglary for females.  Local characteristics
are more important for females than males.
Racial differences persist even after controlling for personal and family
characteristics and deterrence measures.  For example, all else equal, in comparison to
whites, black male juveniles are more likely to sell drugs, commit robbery, and commit18
assault.  It is not clear why racial differences exist after controlling for personal, family,
county characteristics, the unemployment rate and deterrence measures.  One explanation
is that race may act as a proxy for unobservable neighborhood or school characteristics.
Education of the parents has a more pronounced impact on female juvenile
criminal activity than that of males.  This is especially true for mother’s education, where
the daughters of college educated mothers have lower propensity to sell drugs, assault,
rob or steal.  Religious beliefs impact the propensity to commit crime as does the family
structure.  Male juveniles who come from two-parent families are less likely to assault
and sell drugs, while juvenile females from two-parent families are less likely to sell
drugs, assault and rob, which suggests that family supervision has an impact on
delinquent behavior.
Simulations show that the increase in unemployment and family poverty can
explain approximately 14 percent of the increase in juvenile crime between 1989 and
1993, and the decline in the unemployment rate and the number of children in poverty
explain 28 percent of the decrease in juvenile crime between 1993 and 1996. 
These results, taken together, show that the notion of “new breed of young
predators who do not respond to incentives” does not have empirical support.  Juveniles
do respond to incentives and sanctions. Employment opportunities, increased family




From:   National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
Female 0.51
(0.50)




Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if
respondent was 14 years of age at the time of
the interview, equal to 0 otherwise.
Age 15 0.21
(0.41)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if
respondent was 15 years of age at the time of
the interview, equal to 0 otherwise.
Age 16 0.24
(0.42)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
respondent was 16 years of age at the time of
the interview, equal to 0 otherwise.
Age 17 0.23
(0.42)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if
respondent was 17 years of age at the time of
the interview, equal to 0 otherwise.
Hispanic 0.17
(0.37)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
respondent said they were of Hispanic or
Latino origin, equal to 0 otherwise.
Black 0.24
(0.43)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
respondent said they were black or African
American, equal to zero otherwise.
Asian 0.07
(0.25)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
respondent said they were Asian or Pacific
Islander, equal to 0 otherwise.
Native American 0.02
(0.13)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
respondent said they were Native American
or American  Indian, equal to 0 otherwise.
Other Race 0.09
(0.28)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
respondent said they belonged to an
unspecified “other” race, equal to 0
otherwise.
Father-No High School 0.10
(0.30)
Dichotomous  variable equal to 1 if resident
father did not graduate from high school,
equal to 0 otherwise.
Father-High School Grad. 0.21
(0.41)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if resident
father graduated from high school or
received a GED, equal to 0 otherwise.20
Father-Some College 0.12
(0.32)
Dichotomous  variable equal to 1 if the
resident father attended college but did not
graduate, equal to 0 otherwise.
Father-College Grad. 0.22
(0.41)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the




Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there was
no resident father or if respondent did know
father’s schooling, otherwise equal to 0.
Mother-No High School 0.14
(0.35)
Dichotomous  variable equal to 1 if resident
mother did not graduate from high school,
equal to 0 otherwise.
Mother-High School Grad. 0.32
(0.47)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if resident
mother graduated from high school or
received a GED, equal to 0 otherwise.
Mother-Some College 0.18
(0.39)
Dichotomous  variable equal to 1 if the
resident mother attended college but did not
graduate, equal to 0 otherwise.
Mother-College Graduate 0.26
(0.44)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
resident mother graduated from college,
equal to 0 otherwise.
Mother-Education Missing 0.10
(0.30)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there was
no resident mother or if respondent did know
mother’s schooling, otherwise equal to 0.
Two Parent Family 0.66
(0.47)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if
respondent lived with two parents, equal to 0
otherwise.
Parent on Welfare 0.12
(0.32)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if either
resident parent received public assistance,
and equal to 0 otherwise.
Born Again Christian 0.26
(0.44)
Dichotomous  variable equal to 1 if
respondents said they were Born Again
Christian, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Catholic 0.26
(0.44)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if
respondents said they were Catholic, and
equal to 0 otherwise.
No Religion 0.12
(0.32)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if
respondents said they had no religious
beliefs, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Baptist 0.22
(0.41)
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 if
respondent said they were  Baptist, and equal
to 0 otherwise.21
From:   1990 Census of Population and Housing
County Unemployment 0.07
(0.02)
Percent unemployed of the civilian labor
force in the county of residence.
% County Rural 0.23
(0.27)
Proportion of the county population living in
a rural area.
% County Urban 0.66
(0.39)
Proportion of the county population living in
an urban area.
County Population Density 0.58
(1.53)
Persons per square kilometer in the county of
residence.
% County Pop. Black 0.15
(0.14)
Proportion of the county population black.
% County Prop. Hispanic 0.10
(0.14)
Proportion of the county population
Hispanic.
From:   USA Counties (Bureau of the Census, 1994)
Per Capita Police Spending 90.55
(45.18)
Per capita local government direct general
expenditures on police protection in the





Per capita local government direct general




Proportion voting Democratic in the 1992
presidential elections in the county of
residence.
% Ross  Perot 0.18
(0.06)
Proportion voting for  Perot in the 1992
presidential elections in the county of
residence.
From:   Uniform Crime Reports (FBI, 1994)
County Crime Rate 5998.48
(2859.49)
The number crimes in the county per
100,000 persons.
Arrests per Violent Crime 0.46
(0.29)
Total violent crime arrests divided by the
number of violent crimes in the county of
residence, 1993. 
Arrests per Property Crime 0.19
(0.09)
Total property crime arrests divided by the




Descriptive Statistics for Juvenile Offenses
Variable Definition Mean Std.  Dev.
In the past 12 months did you . . .
Sold Drugs sell marijuana or other drugs? 0.073 0.261
Sold Drugs_12 . . . 1 or 2 times 0.037 0.189
Sold Drugs_34 . . . 3 or 4 times 0.011 0.103
Sold Drugs_5+ . . . 5 or more times 0.026 0.158
Assault hurt someone badly enough  to need
bandages or care from a doctor or nurse? 0.194 0.396
Assault_12 . . . 1 or 2 times 0.148 0.355
Assault_34 . . . 3 or 4 times 0.024 0.154
Assault_5+ . . . 5 or more times 0.022 0.147
Robbery use or threaten to use a weapon to get
something from someone? 0.044 0.205
Robbery_12 . . . 1 or 2 times 0.032 0.177
Robbery_34 . . . 3 or 4 times 0.006 0.079
Robbery_5+ . . . 5 or more times 0.006 0.074
Burglary go into a house to steal something? 0.054 0.227
Burglary_12 . . . 1 or 2 times 0.038 0.192
Burglary_34 . . . 3 or 4 times 0.007 0.083
Burglary_5+ . . . 5 or more times 0.009 0.094
Theft steal something worth more than $50? 0.056 0.231
Theft_12 . . . 1 or 2 times 0.038 0.191
Theft_34 . . . 3 or 4 times 0.008 0.091
Theft_5+ . . . 5 or more times 0.010 0.10023
Table 3
Proportion of Juveniles Who Committed
at Least One Crime
Male Female
All races 0.361 0.190
White 0.348 0.169
Black 0.401 0.229
Native American 0.463 0.295
Asian 0.310 0.146
Other 0.381 0.252
Juvenile Crime Commission Rates
Crimes Males Females
None 0.639 0.810
One type of Crime0.235 0.138
2 Different Crimes 0.071 0.034
3 Different Crimes 0.030 0.012
4 Different Crimes 0.014 0.005
5 Different Crimes 0.011 0.00224
Table 4
Juvenile Crime Commission Rates by Type of Offense
Selling Drugs
Male Female
All races 0.1008 0.0477








All races 0.0599 0.0290








All races 0.2710 0.1211









All races 0.0752 0.0384
Native American 0.1397 0.0733
Black 0.0733 0.0269






All races 0.0753 0.0342







Juvenile Crime by Family Structure and Poverty




0 1 2 3 4 5+
No 67.3 21.1 6.6 2.9 1.4 0.8





Assault Robbery Burglary Theft
No 9.5 23.6 5.7 6.6 7.1
Yes 6.3 17.4 3.7 4.9 4.9




0 1 2 3 4 5+
No 73.6 18.0 5.0 1.9 0.9 * 0.6





Assault Robbery Burglary Theft
No 7.2 18.6 4.2 5.2 5.3
Yes 8.4 25.3 6.3 7.5 8.3































Selling Drugs 0.070 0.104 1,210,000 3,748,000 --
Assault 0.190 0.042, 0.330 * 3,278,000 7,033,000 1,488,000
Robbery 0.042 -- 725,000 1,680,000 411,501
Burglary 0.050 0.024 866,000 2,057,000 2,106,000
Theft 0.050 0.026 860,000 2,049,000 3,891,000
*  The entries in this cell represent the offense rates for “attacking someone,” and
“hitting students,” respectively.28
Table 7A
The Determinants of Selling Drugs—Juvenile Males
Variable Marginal Effect Std. Err.
Black 0.01839** (0.00977)
Asian -0.03157*** (0.00884)
Native American 0.10180*** (0.03635)






Born Again Christian -0.02981*** (0.00762)
Catholic -0.00927 (0.00896)
Baptist -0.00289 (0.01005)
No Religion 0.02843*** (0.01130)
Father-No High School 0.00845 (0.01528)
Father-High School Grad. 0.00235 (0.01105)
Father-Some College 0.01787 (0.01611)
Mother-No High School 0.00555 (0.01310)
Mother-High School Grad. 0.00789 (0.00956)
Mother-Some College 0.02555** (0.01267)
Father-Education Missing 0.01016 (0.01419)
Mother-Education Missing 0.02167* (0.01224)
Two Parent Family -0.02709** (0.01292)
Parent on Welfare 0.00852 (0.00914)
County Unemployment 0.35624* (0.19126)
Per Capita Welfare Spending 0.00011* (0.00006)
County Population Density -0.01014*** (0.00257)
% County Rural -0.06481 (0.04192)
% County Urban -0.01772 (0.02930)
% County Pop. Black -0.08390 (0.05267)
% County Pop. Hispanic -0.15917*** (0.04453)
% Ross  Perot 0.22794** (0.09691)
% Democrat 0.14380*** (0.04685)
County Crime Rate 0.0000001 (0.000002)
Per Capita Police Spending 0.00015 (0.00021)
Arrests Per Property Crime 0.06246 (0.05799)
Arrests Per Violent Crime -0.04229** (0.01679)
n = 8026
Log Likelihood = -2466.37
The standard errors are Huber corrected. *  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at
the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level.29
Table 7B
The Determinants of Assault—Juvenile Males
Variable Marginal Effect Std. Err.
Black 0.03702** (0.01790)
Asian -0.01893 (0.02745)
Native American 0.06494 (0.04340)






Born Again Christian -0.03667** (0.01432)
Catholic -0.03135* (0.01830)
Baptist -0.00304 (0.01384)
No Religion 0.01971 (0.01891)
Father-No High School 0.03350 (0.02603)
Father-High School Grad. 0.07768*** (0.01892)
Father-Some College 0.04902** (0.02138)
Mother-No High School 0.02355 (0.02396)
Mother-High School Grad. 0.01095 (0.01781)
Mother-Some College 0.00786 (0.01540)
Father-Education Missing 0.06205*** (0.02101)
Mother-Education Missing 0.00655 (0.02608)
Two Parent Family -0.03843** (0.01741)
Parent on Welfare 0.02432 (0.01674)
County Unemployment 0.31657 (0.28663)
Per Capita Welfare Spending 0.00020** (0.00010)
County Population Density -0.00192 (0.00386)
% County Rural 0.04521 (0.06638)
% County Urban 0.04919 (0.03784)
% County Pop. Black 0.09828 (0.07018)
% County Pop. Hispanic 0.00079 (0.06097)
% Ross  Perot 0.33295** (0.13256)
% Democrat -0.09326 (0.07282)
County Crime Rate -0.000006 (0.000003)
Per Capita Police Spending 0.00005 (0.00030)
Arrests Per Property Crime -0.03700 (0.09170)
Arrests Per Violent Crime -0.06265* (0.03312)
n = 8031
Log Likelihood = -4617.04
The standard errors are Huber corrected. *  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance
at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level.30
Table 7C
The Determinants of Robbery—Juvenile Males
Variable Marginal Effect Std. Err.
Black 0.01500** (0.00758)
Asian -0.00555 (0.00943)
Native American 0.03325 (0.02619)






Born Again Christian -0.00589 (0.00639)
Catholic -0.01462** (0.00643)
Baptist -0.00782 (0.00744)
No Religion 0.01074 (0.00871)
Father-No High School 0.00823 (0.01273)
Father-High School Grad. -0.000004 (0.00725)
Father-Some College 0.01314 (0.01005)
Mother-No High School 0.01168 (0.01202)
Mother-High School Grad. -0.00057 (0.00712)
Mother-Some College -0.00555 (0.00764)
Father-Education Missing 0.02154** (0.00975)
Mother-Education Missing 0.01341 (0.00980)
Two Parent Family 0.00024 (0.00866)
Parent on Welfare 0.02512*** (0.00879)
County Unemployment 0.28533** (0.13106)
Per Capita Welfare Spending 0.00010** (0.00004)
County Population Density -0.00357** (0.00154)
% County Rural -0.03658 (0.02405)
% County Urban 0.00830 (0.01545)
% County Pop. Black 0.01161 (0.03249)
% County Pop. Hispanic -0.04935* (0.03034)
% Ross  Perot -0.00278 (0.06742)
% Democrat -0.02659 (0.03678)
County Crime Rate -0.000001 (0.000002)
Per Capita Police Spending -0.00011 (0.00018)
Arrests Per Property Crime -0.00349 (0.03951)
Arrests Per Violent Crime -0.00616 (0.01721)
n = 8041
Log Likelihood = -1778.09
The standard errors are Huber corrected. *  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at
the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level.31
Table 7D
The Determinants of Burglary—Juvenile Males
Variable Marginal Effect Std. Err.
Black 0.00322 (0.01007)
Asian -0.00864 (0.01006)
Native American 0.04560* (0.03164)






Born Again Christian 0.00153 (0.00738)
Catholic 0.00278 (0.00808)
Baptist -0.00449 (0.00848)
No Religion 0.03723*** (0.01151)
Father-No High School 0.00028 (0.01376)
Father-High School Grad. 0.00684 (0.00949)
Father-Some College -0.00274 (0.01089)
Mother-No High School -0.00773 (0.01010)
Mother-High School Grad. -0.00515 (0.00860)
Mother-Some College -0.01228 (0.00894)
Father-Education Missing 0.02464** (0.01100)
Mother-Education Missing 0.01831* (0.01011)
Two Parent Family -0.00284 (0.00854)
Parent on Welfare 0.03054*** (0.01114)
County Unemployment -0.02519 (0.18942)
Per Capita Welfare Spending 0.00005 (0.00007)
County Population Density -0.00136 (0.00250)
% County Rural -0.04753 (0.03384)
% County Urban -0.00193 (0.02108)
% County Pop. Black -0.03844 (0.04655)
% County Pop. Hispanic 0.01929 (0.05871)
% Ross  Perot -0.00773 (0.07892)
% Democrat -0.03303 (0.05111)
County Crime Rate -0.0000007 (0.000003)
Per Capita Police Spending -0.00024 (0.00019)
Arrests Per Property Crime 0.06343 (0.04672)
Arrests Per Violent Crime 0.00185 (0.01644)
n = 8039
Log Likelihood = -2118.96
The standard errors are Huber corrected. *  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at
the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level.32
Table 7E
The Determinants of Theft—Juvenile Males
Variable Marginal Effect Std. Err.
Black 0.00123 (0.00805)
Asian -0.01363 (0.01095)
Native American 0.04388* (0.02915)






Born Again Christian -0.00373 (0.00742)
Catholic -0.00058 (0.00718)
Baptist -0.01313 (0.00776)
No Religion 0.03853*** (0.01324)
Father-No High School -0.01096 (0.01105)
Father-High School Grad. 0.00334 (0.00953)
Father-Some College 0.00867 (0.00852)
Mother-No High School 0.01644 (0.01209)
Mother-High School Grad. 0.01355* (0.00742)
Mother-Some College 0.00789 (0.00911)
Father-Education Missing 0.01684* (0.00980)
Mother-Education Missing 0.04364*** (0.01482)
Two Parent Family -0.00770 (0.00862)
Parent on Welfare 0.04381*** (0.00951)
County Unemployment 0.02270 (0.16824)
Per Capita Welfare Spending 0.00005 (0.00004)
County Population Density -0.00255 (0.00162)
% County Rural -0.06739** (0.03002)
% County Urban -0.01734 (0.01749)
% County Pop. Black -0.03875 (0.04111)
% County Pop. Hispanic 0.01724 (0.02437)
% Ross  Perot -0.00307 (0.06340)
% Democrat -0.05479 (0.03929)
County Crime Rate -0.00000005(0.000002)
Per Capita Police Spending 0.00001 (0.00015)
Arrests Per Property Crime 0.07028 (0.04449)
Arrests Per Violent Crime -0.01782 (0.01738)
n = 8043
Log Likelihood = -2081.80
The standard errors are Huber corrected. *  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at
the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level.33
  Table 8
Summary Results for Juvenile Males
Selling
Drugs
Assault Robbery Burglary Theft
Variable
Black + + +




Age 14 + + + + +
Age 15 + + + + +
Age 16 + + + + +
Age 17 + + + + +
Born Again Christian -- --
Catholic -- --
No Religion + + +
Father High school +
Father some College +
Mother High school +
Mother some College +
Two Parent Family -- --
Parent on Welfare + + +




Arrests Per Violent Crime -- --34
Table 9
The Impact of Selected Determinants on Juvenile Offenses
Selling
Drugs
Assault Robbery Burglary Theft
Two Parent
(67%)
A Switch To Two-Parent
Family -2.7% -3.8%
Parent on Welfare
(12%) Family Out of Welfare -2.5% -3.0% -4.4%
Unemployment
(6.8%)






A 50% Increase in Arrest
Rate -1.1% -1.4%
The numbers in parentheses in the first column are sample means for the corresponding
variable.35
 Table A1
Probit Estimates—No Religious Beliefs
Variable Marginal Effect Std. Err.
Black -0.00833 (0.01091)
Asian 0.02083 (0.01634)







Father-No High School0.01392 (0.01678)
Father-High School Grad. 0.01915 (0.01255)
Father-Some College 0.00734 (0.01399)
Mother-No High school 0.05915*** (0.01699)
Mother-High School Grad. 0.02565** (0.01099)
Mother-Some College 0.00252 (0.01224)
Father-Education Missing 0.03703** (0.01517)
Mother-Education Missing 0.06727*** (0.01666)
Two Parent Family -0.01910 (0.01265)
Parent on Welfare 0.05512*** (0.01371)
County Unemployment -0.00355 (0.20485)
Per Capita Welfare Spending -0.00013*** (0.00005)
County Population Density 0.00318 (0.00376)
% County Rural -0.01498 (0.03732)
% County Urban 0.00223 (0.02439)
% County Pop. Black -0.25921*** (0.04433)
% County Pop. Hispanic -0.04935 (0.03939)
% County Ross  Perot 0.32406*** (0.08850)
% County Democrat 0.14030*** (0.04894)
n = 8407
Log Likelihood = -3129.31
 *  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level.
***  indicates significance at the 1% level.
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Table A2
Summary Results for Juvenile Females
Selling
Drugs
Assault Robbery Burglary Theft
Variable Female Female Female Female Female
Black -- +
Native American + +
Asian --
Other Race + +
Hispanic +
Age14 + + +
Age15 + +
Age16 + -- -- +
Age17 + -- --
Born Again Christian -- --
Baptist --
Catholic
No Religion + + +
Father-No High School
Father-High School Grad. + +
Father-Some College
Mother-No High School +
Mother-High School Grad. + + + +
Mother-Some College + +
Two Parent Family -- -- --
Parent on Welfare + +
County Unemployment +
County Population Density -- -- -- -- --
% County Rural -- -- --
% County Urban
% County Pop. Black --
% County Pop. Hispanic -- -- --
% Ross  Perot +
% Democrat +




Per Capita Police Spending
Arrests Per Violent Crime -- --
Arrests Per Property Crime37
Table A3
The Determinants of Selling Drugs—Juvenile Males
(Ordered Probit)
Marginal Effects For . . .
Variable Coefficient Selling Drugs
0 times
Selling Drugs
1 or 2 times
Selling Drugs






0.3912 -0.1601 -0.0602 -0.1709
Black 0.11740*
(0.06159)
-0.0184 0.0075 0.0028 0.0080
Asian -0.22366**
(0.09626)
0.0351 -0.0143 -0.0054 -0.0153
Native American 0.45851***
(0.14496)
-0.0719 0.0294 0.0111 0.0314
Other Race 0.11445
(0.08121)
-0.0179 0.0073 0.0028 0.0078
Hispanic 0.15294**
(0.07197)
-0.0240 0.0098 0.0037 0.0105
Age14 0.48490***
(0.09577)
-0.0760 0.0311 0.0117 0.0332
Age15 0.65234***
(0.09043)
-0.1022 0.0418 0.0157 0.0447
Age16 0.77192***
(0.08702)
-0.1210 0.0495 0.0186 0.0529
Age17 0.85167***
(0.08704)
-0.1335 0.0546 0.0205 0.0583
Born Again Christian -0.19641***
(0.05627)
0.0308 -0.0126 -0.0047 -0.0135
Catholic -0.04749
(0.05602)
0.0074 -0.0030 -0.0011 -0.0033
Baptist -0.02077
(0.06012)
0.0033 -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0014
No Religion 0.19160***
(0.06023)
-0.0300 0.0123 0.0046 0.0131
Father-No High School 0.06331
(0.08636)





-0.0054 0.0022 0.0008 0.0024
Father-Some College 0.10802
(0.07320)
-0.0169 0.0069 0.0026 0.0074
Mother-No High School 0.02801
(0.07569)






-0.0072 0.0030 0.0011 0.0032
Mother-Some College 0.14426**
(0.06307)










-0.0198 0.0081 0.0030 0.0086
Two Parent Family -0.17856**
(0.06939)
0.0280 -0.0115 -0.0043 -0.0122
Parent on Welfare 0.05139
(0.06240)
-0.0081 0.0033 0.0012 0.0035
County Unemployment 2.19963*
(1.20062)










0.0100 -0.0041 -0.0015 -0.0044
% County Rural -0.42538*
(0.25232)
0.0667 -0.0273 -0.0103 -0.0291
% County Urban -0.10038
(0.15879)
0.0157 -0.0064 -0.0024 -0.0069
% County Pop. Black -0.52061*
(0.29742)
0.0816 -0.0334 -0.0125 -0.0357
% County Pop. Hispanic -1.00010***
(0.24186)
0.1568 -0.0641 -0.0241 -0.0685
% Ross  Perot 1.57530***
(0.51886)
-0.2469 0.1010 0.0380 0.1079
% Democrat 0.95654***
(0.29534)
-0.1499 0.0614 0.0231 0.0655
County Crime Rate 0.000002
(0.00001)















0.0441 -0.0181 -0.0068 -0.0193
n = 8026
Log Likelihood = -3285.65
*  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level,
***  indicates significance at the 1% level.39
Table A4
The Determinants of Committing Assault—Juvenile Males
(Ordered Probit)





Assault 1 or 2
times
Commit







0.3464 -0.2048 -0.0623 -0.0792
Black 0.11161**
(0.04414)
-0.0368 0.0217 0.0066 0.0084
Asian -0.04888
(0.06456)
0.0161 -0.0095 -0.0029 -0.0037
Native American 0.20248*
(0.10955)
-0.0667 0.0394 0.0120 0.0153
Other Race 0.02454
(0.06404)
-0.0081 0.0048 0.0015 0.0018
Hispanic 0.04632
(0.05680)
-0.0153 0.0090 0.0027 0.0035
Age14 0.08798*
(0.05289)
-0.0290 0.0171 0.0052 0.0066
Age15 0.09634**
(0.04893)
-0.0317 0.0188 0.0057 0.0073
Age16 0.08016*
(0.04772)
-0.0264 0.0156 0.0048 0.0060
Age17 0.05188
(0.04852)
-0.0171 0.0101 0.0031 0.0039
Born Again Christian -0.08152**
(0.03967)
0.0269 -0.0159 -0.0048 -0.0061
Catholic -0.07204*
(0.04119)
0.0237 -0.0140 -0.0043 -0.0054
Baptist -0.00295
(0.04282)
0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002
No Religion 0.11746**
(0.04623)
-0.0387 0.0229 0.0070 0.0089
Father-No High School 0.12521**
(0.06331)





-0.0767 0.0454 0.0138 0.0176
Father-Some College 0.15002***
(0.05443)
-0.0494 0.0292 0.0089 0.0113
Mother-No High School 0.06193
(0.05596)






-0.0089 0.0053 0.0016 0.0020
Mother-Some College 0.01895
(0.04783)










-0.0264 0.0156 0.0047 0.0060
Two Parent Family -0.10973**
(0.04975)
0.0362 -0.0214 -0.0065 -0.0083
Parent on Welfare 0.08806*
(0.04604)
-0.0290 0.0172 0.0052 0.0066
County Unemployment 1.08939
(0.88136)










0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0005
% County Rural 0.11712
(0.16134)
-0.0386 0.0228 0.0069 0.0088
% County Urban 0.14283
(0.10854)
-0.0471 0.0278 0.0085 0.0108
% County Pop. Black 0.32605
(0.21065)
-0.1074 0.0635 0.0193 0.0246
% County Pop. Hispanic -0.13846
(0.17684)
0.0456 -0.0270 -0.0082 -0.0104
% Ross  Perot 1.07915***
(0.37659)
-0.3555 0.2102 0.0640 0.0813
% Democrat -0.25071
(0.21968)
0.0826 -0.0488 -0.0149 -0.0189
County Crime Rate -0.00001
(0.00001)















0.0607 -0.0359 -0.0109 -0.0139
n = 8031
Log Likelihood = -6296.16
*  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level,
***  indicates significance at the 1% level.41
Table A5
The Determinants of Committing Robbery—Juvenile Males
(Ordered Probit)















0.2031 -0.1345 -0.0316 -0.0370
Black 0.14388**
(0.06788)
-0.0161 0.0107 0.0025 0.0029
Asian -0.04722
(0.10988)
0.0053 -0.0035 -0.0008 -0.0010
Native American 0.29391*
(0.15871)
-0.0329 0.0218 0.0051 0.0060
Other Race 0.13575
(0.09645)
-0.0152 0.0101 0.0024 0.0028
Hispanic 0.00237
(0.09054)
-0.0003 0.0002 0 0
Age14 0.23549***
(0.08907)
-0.0263 0.0174 0.0041 0.0048
Age15 0.25115***
(0.08429)
-0.0281 0.0186 0.0044 0.0051
Age16 0.31404***
(0.08082)
-0.0351 0.0233 0.0055 0.0064
Age17 0.23648***
(0.08367)
-0.0264 0.0175 0.0041 0.0048
Born Again Christian -0.07547
(0.06327)
0.0084 -0.0056 -0.0013 -0.0015
Catholic -0.13695**
(0.06697)
0.0153 -0.0101 -0.0024 -0.0028
Baptist -0.05432
(0.06702)
0.0061 -0.0040 -0.0009 -0.0011
No Religion 0.10214
(0.07237)
-0.0114 0.0076 0.0018 0.0021
Father-No High School 0.08402
(0.10106)





0.0003 -0.0002 0 0
Father-Some College 0.11317
(0.08795)
-0.0127 0.0084 0.0020 0.0023
Mother-No High School 0.08865
(0.08401)






0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
Mother-Some College -0.06287
(0.07849)










-0.0135 0.0089 0.0021 0.0025
Two Parent Family -0.00184
(0.07702)
0.0002 -0.0001 0 0
Parent on Welfare 0.21822***
(0.06627)
-0.0244 0.0162 0.0038 0.0044
County Unemployment 2.37942*
(1.39485)










0.0031 -0.0021 -0.0005 -0.0006
% County Rural -0.32608
(0.25635)
0.0365 -0.0241 -0.0057 -0.0066
% County Urban 0.09398
(0.17406)
-0.0105 0.0070 0.0016 0.0019
% County Pop. Black 0.07668
(0.32476)
-0.0086 0.0057 0.0013 0.0016
% County Pop. Hispanic -0.46450*
(0.26404)
0.0519 -0.0344 -0.0081 -0.0095
% Ross  Perot 0.04674
(0.62878)
-0.0052 0.0035 0.0008 0.0010
% Democrat -0.19414
(0.36266)
0.0217 -0.0144 -0.0034 -0.0040
County Crime Rate -0.00001
(0.00002)















0.0053 -0.0035 -0.0008 -0.0010
n = 8041
Log Likelihood = -2161.43
*  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level,
***  indicates significance at the 1% level.43
Table A6
The Determinants of Committing Burglary—Juvenile Males
(Ordered Probit)















0.1999 -0.1273 -0.0294 -0.0433
Black 0.03661
(0.06285)
-0.0050 0.0032 0.0007 0.0011
Asian -0.05594
(0.09598)
0.0077 -0.0049 -0.0011 -0.0017
Native American 0.26616*
(0.15445)
-0.0365 0.0233 0.0054 0.0079
Other Race 0.21833**
(0.09343)
-0.0300 0.0191 0.0044 0.0065
Hispanic -0.13259
(0.08304)
0.0182 -0.0116 -0.0027 -0.0039
Age14 0.17035**
(0.08027)
-0.0234 0.0149 0.0034 0.0051
Age15 0.23583***
(0.07594)
-0.0324 0.0206 0.0048 0.0070
Age16 0.22467***
(0.07258)
-0.0308 0.0196 0.0045 0.0067
Age17 0.14245*
(0.07474)
-0.0196 0.0124 0.0029 0.0042
Born Again Christian 0.01160
(0.05852)
-0.0016 0.0010 0.0002 0.0003
Catholic 0.02867
(0.06010)
-0.0039 0.0025 0.0006 0.0009
Baptist -0.03311
(0.06225)
0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0010
No Religion 0.24318***
(0.06569)
-0.0334 0.0212 0.0049 0.0072
Father-No High School 0.00763
(0.09596)





-0.0074 0.0047 0.0011 0.0016
Father-Some College -0.01492
(0.07985)
0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0004
Mother-No High School -0.05394
(0.08144)






0.0058 -0.0037 -0.0008 -0.0013
Mother-Some College -0.09436
(0.07067)










-0.0198 0.0126 0.0029 0.0043
Two Parent Family -0.01942
(0.07011)
0.0027 -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0006
Parent on Welfare 0.19416***
(0.06582)
-0.0266 0.0170 0.0039 0.0058
County Unemployment -0.03600
(1.29731)










0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0003
% County Rural -0.32180
(0.24686)
0.0442 -0.0281 -0.0065 -0.0096
% County Urban 0.03704
(0.16106)
-0.0051 0.0032 0.0007 0.0011
% County Pop. Black -0.30343
(0.31063)
0.0416 -0.0265 -0.0061 -0.0090
% County Pop. Hispanic 0.11159
(0.27763)
-0.0153 0.0098 0.0022 0.0033
% Ross  Perot -0.03526
(0.55388)
0.0048 -0.0031 -0.0007 -0.0010
% Democrat -0.18990
(0.31826)
0.2610 -0.0166 -0.0038 -0.0056
County Crime Rate -0.000003
(0.00001)















-0.0044 0.0028 0.0006 0.0010
n = 8039
Log Likelihood = -2624.25
*  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level,
***  indicates significance at the 1% level.45
Table A7
The Determinants of Committing Theft—Juvenile Males
(Ordered Probit)
Marginal Effects For . . .
Variable Coefficient Commit Theft
0 times
Commit Theft
1 or 2 times
Commit Theft






0.2093 -0.1260 -0.0334 -0.0499
Black 0.03181
(0.06557)
-0.0042 0.0025 0.0007 0.0010
Asian -0.10642
(0.09730)
0.0141 -0.0085 -0.0022 -0.0034
Native American 0.29239*
(0.15055)
-0.0387 0.0233 0.0062 0.0092
Other Race 0.13048
(0.08916)
-0.0173 0.0104 0.0028 0.0041
Hispanic -0.12063
(0.08468)
0.0160 -0.0096 -0.0025 -0.0038
Age14 0.19604**
(0.08881)
-0.0259 0.0156 0.0041 0.0062
Age15 0.34942***
(0.08001)
-0.0462 0.0278 0.0074 0.0110
Age16 0.34411***
(0.07879)
-0.0455 0.0274 0.0073 0.0109
Age17 0.36470***
(0.07971)
-0.0482 0.0290 0.0077 0.0115
Born Again Christian -0.01498
(0.06095)
0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0005
Catholic 0.00631
(0.06003)
-0.0008 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002
Baptist -0.09177
(0.06683)
0.0121 -0.0073 -0.0019 -0.0029
No Religion 0.26646***
(0.06524)
-0.0352 0.0212 0.0056 0.0084
Father-No High School -0.08484
(0.09774)





-0.0043 0.0026 0.0007 0.0010
Father-Some College 0.05813
(0.07888)
-0.0077 0.0046 0.0012 0.0018
Mother-No High School 0.13592*
(0.07960)






-0.0113 0.0068 0.0018 0.0027
Mother-Some College 0.04670
(0.07181)










-0.0369 0.0222 0.0059 0.0088
Two Parent Family -0.07224
(0.07492)
0.0096 -0.0057 -0.0015 -0.0023
Parent on Welfare 0.28083***
(0.06198)
-0.0371 0.0223 0.0059 0.0089
County Unemployment 0.42621
(1.31611)










0.0028 -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0007
% County Rural-0.55248**
(0.24955)
0.0731 -0.0440 -0.0117 -0.0174
% County Urban -0.10553
(0.16439)
0.0140 -0.0084 -0.0022 -0.0033
% County Pop. Black -0.34072
(0.33262)
0.0451 -0.0271 -0.0072 -0.0107
% County Pop. Hispanic 0.14583
(0.25649)
-0.0193 0.0116 0.0031 0.0046
% Ross  Perot 0.02523
(0.56397)
-0.0033 0.0020 0.0005 0.0008
% Democrat -0.30470
(0.32573)
0.0403 -0.0242 -0.0064 -0.0096
County Crime Rate 0.000002
(0.00001)















0.0100 -0.0060 -0.0016 -0.0024
n = 8043
Log Likelihood = -2619.54
*  indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level,
***  indicates significance at the 1% level.47
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